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Axel Borsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel 
Old age social security benefits represent the largest part of the German social 
budget. In 1993, social security benefits amounted to 10.3 percent of GDP, a 
share more than two and a half times larger than in the United States. Social 
security income represents about 80 percent of  household income of house- 
holds headed by a person aged sixty-five and over. 
The German  social  security  system (the  Gesetzliche  Rentenversicherung 
and its equivalents)' is large because it is mandatory for every worker except 
the self-employed and those with very low incomes. In addition, the German 
social security system is very generous in two respects. First, the system has a 
very high replacement rate, generating net retirement  incomes that are cur- 
rently about 72 percent of preretirement net earnings for a worker with a forty- 
five-year earnings history and average lifetime  This is substantially 
higher than, for example, the corresponding U.S. net replacement rate of about 
53 percent.' Second, the system has very generous early retirement provisions, 
including easy ways to claim disability benefits, increasing the number of ben- 
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1. For example, the retirement system of civil servants. 
2. Replacement  rate is here defined as the current pension of a retiree with a forty-five-year 
average earnings history divided by  the current average earnings of  all dependently employed 
workers. A different definition of  replacement  rate is used in app. B. Replacement  rate is also 
defined differently when used relative to the most recent earnings of a retiring worker, which are 
usually higher than the lifetime average. 
3. Using the same replacement rate concept as in n. 2 above. 
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eficiaries. The average retirement age is quite young in West Germany (about 
age fifty-nine) and even younger in East germ an^.^ The prevalence of  early 
retirement comes in addition to a population that is already quite old and has 
contributed to a significantly higher ratio of pensioners to workers than in other 
countries. Currently, one hundred German workers pay for sixty-four pension 
recipients,  as opposed  to  only  twenty-five  pension  recipients  per  hundred 
workers in the United  state^.^ 
The tendency toward early retirement is particularly problematic in times of 
population aging. The proportion of persons aged sixty and older will increase 
from 21 percent in 1995 to 36 percent in the year 2035, when population aging 
will peak in Germany. With Switzerland and Austria, this will be the highest 
proportion in the world. The old age dependency ratio will almost double, from 
57 percent in  1995 to  102 percent  in 2035. As a consequence, the German 
social security contribution rate is expected to increase dramatically and sub- 
stantially to exceed the rates in other industrialized countries. While, in  1997, 
the contribution rate stood at about 20 percent of gross income,6 even conser- 
vative estimates put  the  contribution  rate  significantly  above  30 percent of 
gross income at the peak of population aging if the current system and current 
retirement behavior remain as they are. Population aging will dramatically re- 
duce the rate of return of the German retirement system. Estimates vary by the 
way benefits and contributions will be adjusted; rates of return will be around 
zero for cohorts born after 1970 (see Borsch-Supan 1997; and Schnabel 1997). 
Key questions for public policy  are, therefore, How  much of  the large and 
increasing retirement burden can be attributed to the incentive effects of the 
public pension system, and which features should be changed to accommodate 
population aging? 
This paper presents a descriptive analysis of the incentive effects of the Ger- 
man old age social security system on retirement decisions. In section 4.1, we 
summarize the labor market behavior of  older German men and women be- 
tween  1960 and now. In section 4.2, we provide a general description of  the 
German public pension system. In section 4.3, we conduct a detailed analysis 
of retirement incentives. Specifically, we compute accrual rates of social secu- 
rity wealth and show that they have actually been negative for those who have 
not retired  early. In section 4.4, we provide  a brief  survey of  the empirical 
literature that attempts to link the incentives of the social security system with 
retirement behavior in West and East Germany. We then synthesize our find- 
ings and conclude. 
4. The average retirement age in a given year is the average age of  those workers receiving a 
5. There is  some double-counting  in both countries  as persons  can receive more than one 
6.  As of  1 January 1997, the total contribution rate is 20.3 percent; 10.15 percent is deducted 
public pension income for the first time. 
pension. 
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4.1  Labor Market Behavior 
In this section, we first depict historical trends in labor force participation, 
participation in the public pension system, and coverage of the elderly by old 
age social security, then we more closely investigate labor market status and 
retirement patterns in the early 1990s. 
As will be explained in section 4.2 below, we include in the public pension 
system all branches of the Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung  (i.e., blue collar, 
white collar, and mining) and also the separate retirement system for civil ser- 
vants. We distinguish old age, disability, and survivor benefits within the public 
pension system. 
Data for the  historical  trends come from the  German  population  survey 
(Mikrozensus, MZ) and the German Department of Labor and Social Affairs 
(Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung, BMAS). Cross-sectional 
data for recent years have mainly been drawn from the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (GSOEP) and from statistics supplied by the German association of pub- 
lic  pension  providers  (Verband  der  deutschen  Rentenversicherungstrager, 
VdR). These data sources are described in more detail in appendix A. 
4.1.1  Historical Trends 
Germany shares the rapid decrease in old age labor force participation with 
most other industrialized countries (fig. 4. l).’ This decrease accelerated after 
1970. In section 4.4, we argue that the dramatic decline after 1970 is at least 
partly due to the introduction of “flexible” retirement arrangements in  1972 
that did not adjust benefits according to actuarial tables. It is interesting to note 
that male labor force participation declined from 1970 to 1990 for all ages over 
fifty and increasingly  so for older persons. Female labor force participation 
increased for all ages under sixty. The increase for the age range from fifty to 
fifty-nine is noteworthy because it contrasts to the decline in male labor force 
participation due to a high share of disability claims among male workers. 
The German public pension system is mandatory for every worker except 
the  self-employed  and  those  with  very  low earnings  (see  sec. 4.2  below). 
Hence, coverage by  the public pension  system  is high and has  steadily in- 
creased from 77 percent in 1960 to a plateau of almost 90  percent around 1980 
(fig. 4.2). The increase in the  1960s and  1970s stemmed from the declining 
share of the self-employed and farmers in the labor force, while the slight de- 
crease in very recent years was caused by the increase in part-time jobs that do 
not require participation in the social safety net. 
In  accordance with  coverage, the number of  beneficiaries  also increased 
sharply from 1960 to 1995 (fig. 4.3). Among those age fifty-five and older, 85 
percent received pensions from the public system in 1995, while this share was 
7. Tables for all figures in this paper are available on request. A 
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Note: By  definition, all persons receiving old age pensions are age 60 and above. Percentage 
receiving disability pensions: share of  those aged 55 and over estimated from 1992 share. Persons 
receiving survivor benefits: some double-counting; very small number of  persons below age 55 
included. Note that table 4.3 below represents the stock of retirees and that fig. 4.29 below shows 
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only a little above 50 percent in 1960. Figure 4.3 distinguishes three kinds of 
pensions: old age and disability pensions based on contributions from own 
earnings and survivor pensions. Most of those who receive a public pension 
receive an old age pension. Disability benefits rose particularly fast in the early 
1980s, until more stringent requirements were put in place. Survivor benefits 
remained about steady. 
The replacement rate of the German public pension system is very generous. 
It increased from 63 percent in  1960 to 72 percent currently (fig. 4.4). Note 
that the replacement rate varied in the short term as indexation to gross wages 
(more recently, net wages) was not automatic but at the discretion of the legis- 
lature. The drop after 1990 is due to the inclusion of the initially very low East 
German pensions, which were subsequently raised to the West German level. 
4.1.2  Labor Market Behavior in Recent Years 
In order to investigate recent labor market behavior in more detail, we pool 
the 1993, 1994, and 1995 waves of the GSOEP. The data cover some seventeen 
thousand persons annually in East and West Germany. We  also use VdR data 
for the number of beneficiaries of the public pension system. 
Figure 4.5 shows the rapid decline in labor force participation around age 
sixty for both female and male workers and the large share of persons who exit 
the labor force even earlier. Particularly sharp declines in labor force participa- 
tion are visible at ages fifty-six (male only), sixty, and sixty-five. By age sixty- 
six, male labor force participation has dropped below 7.5 percent. 
Figure 4.6 looks more closely at the employment status of  males and fe- 
males in Germany. Employment status is defined as actual occupation. Retired 141  Social Security and Retirement in  Germany 
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Fig. 4.5  Labor force participation rates 
Sources: GSOEP 1993-95;  own calculations. 
Nore: Percentage of  sample persons of given age. 
in  this  figure  refers  to persons  who  call  themselves  retired  regardless  of 
whether they receive some kind of pension. The category includes disabled 
persons and persons having retired before being eligible for a public pension. 
Unemployed refers to the registered  unemployed who are still seeking work. 
Unemployment increases with age and peaks immediately before  age sixty. 
The category unemployed does not include those who receive unemployment 
benefits but are actually retired. As will be explained in section 4.2 below, 
unemployment is one of the many pathways to early retirement and has been 
encouraged by the government in official and, even more so, in unofficial “pre- 
retirement” schemes (Vorruhestund). 
Figure 4.7 links the labor force status of figure 4.6 with the receipt of public 
pensions. After age fifty-five, a substantial number of workers enter early re- 
tirement without receiving a public pension (old age or disability). These are 
the above-mentioned  workers  who receive  some combination of unemploy- 
ment benefits and severance pay under several preretirement schemes. Eventu- 
ally, by age sixty-five, almost all male and most female preretirees will receive 
a public pension. Preretirement is high: it peaks between the ages of fifty-six 
and fifty-nine at 20 percent for men and 25 percent for women. 
Figure 4.8 yields a closer look at the different kinds of public pensions that 
were displayed in figure 4.7. About 95 percent of elderly German men and 85 
percent of women receive public old age and disability pension benefits as a 
result of  their own contributions from earnings. In addition, a large share of 
women (strongly increasing with age, peaking at 60 percent for women aged 
seventy-five and older) and a small share of men receive survivor benefits. 
Benefits before age sixty are disability benefits. These disability pensions 100% - 
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Fig. 4.6  Labor force status: a,  males; b,  females 
Source: GSOEP 1993-95. 
Note: Percentage of  sample persons at given age. Unemployed = registered unemployed who are 
willing to work. 80% 
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Fig. 4.7  Labor force status and receipt of own pension: a,  males; b, females 
Source: GSOEP 1993-95. 
Nore: Labor force exit = retired from labor market (includes persons who receive pensions and 
persons with preretirement status); pensioner = receives old age or disability pension; preretire- 
ment = retired from labor market (1) receiving unemployment benefits andor (2) receiving com- 
pensating payments from (former) employer while at zero hours of work. A 
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Fig. 4.8  Recipients of public pension income: a,  males; b, females 
Sources: GSOEP 1993-95; own calculations. 
Note; Survivor, old age, disability, and civil servant pension recipients as share of sample persons 
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Fig. 4.9  Recipients of firm pensions by age 
Sources: GSOEP 1993-95; own calculations. 
Note: Firm pensions as share of  sample persons at given age. 
are converted between the ages of sixty and sixty-five to old age pensions. The 
sharp increase in beneficiaries between the ages of sixty and sixty-five mirrors 
the rapid decline in labor force participation at that age, as seen in figure 4.7. 
The sharp decline of own pensions among women aged seventy-five and older 
is not a true age effect. Rather, the decline reflects a cohort effect because fe- 
male workers aged seventy-five and over had very low labor force participa- 
tion. 
About a quarter of the male elderly (aged sixty-five and over) receive private 
firm pensions (fig. 4.9). This pension comes generally in addition to the public 
pensions depicted in figure 4.8. The share is low relative to British and Ameri- 
can standards, and it is even smaller for the female elderly. Firm pensions have 
been popular and were used to create internal company funds until the very 
favorable corporate income tax treatment was abolished. The “age” pattern in 
figure 4.9 therefore displays strong cohort effects in addition to true age ef- 
fects. 
Not only do a relatively small number of persons receive private firm pen- 
sions, but firm pensions are also relatively low. They account for less than 5 
percent  of  total  retirement  income  among  elderly  households,  the  bulk  of 
whose income is provided by public pensions (about 80 percent). This can be 
seen in figure 4.10. Private asset income also plays a much smaller role than in 
the United States and the United Kingdom and never exceeds 10 percent on 
average at any age. * 100% - 
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Fig. 4.10  Source of household income by age of householder: a, male head of 
household; b, female head of household 
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4.2  Key Features of  the German Pension System 
4.2.1  The History of Retirement Insurance in Germany 
Germany has the oldest formal social security  system, introduced in 1889 
by Chancellor Bismarck. Originally a fully funded disability insurance pro- 
gram, the system became a mandatory retirement insurance program (Gesetz- 
liche  Rentenversicherung,  GRV),  which  was  converted  to  a  pay-as-you-go 
scheme after its capital stock was severely eroded during the Great Depression 
and World War 11.  In the  1960s and 1970s, the German system evolved into 
one of  the most generous pension  systems in the world in terms of both its 
replacement rate and its early retirement provisions.  Germany now faces the 
most dramatic population aging among the industrialized countries, which se- 
verely jeopardizes the social security system in its current, generous form. 
As opposed to those in many other countries (such as the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands), public pensions in Germany are designed to extend the 
standard of living that was achieved during an individual’s work life into retire- 
ment.8 Public pensions are roughly proportional to labor income averaged over 
the life course and incorporate only few redistributive properties (much fewer 
than, e.g., in the United States). This is the reason that the German pension 
system is termed  retirement insurance rather  than  social  security,  as in the 
United States, and most workers still understand  their contributions as insur- 
ance premia rather than taxes, although this appears to be changing in the face 
of the severe benefit cuts currently being discussed in response to population 
aging. 
The retirement insurance system consists of several programs, each provid- 
ing benefits that can be accumulated in certain cases. The system combines old 
age pensions, disability pensions, and survivor pensions. East Germany is now 
fully integrated in the West German retirement system, although a few transi- 
tional rules still apply. Strictly speaking, German retirement insurance is not 
part of the government budget but a separate entity that is subsidized by  the 
federal government. Were there a surplus, social security contributions could 
not  legally be used  to decrease the government  deficit,  as they  can in  the 
United States. 
Until 1972, the system was very inflexible and permitted retirement only at 
age sixty-five, except for disability, which, however, made up for roughly 50 
percent of new retirement entries (see fig. 4.29 be lo^).^ The landmark 1972 
pension  reform  introduced the opportunity to retire at different ages during 
the so-called window of retirement without a direct adjustment of retirement 
8. Hauser (1995) provides an  overview and comparison of  European old age social security 
systems. 
9. We use retirement in this section to refer to the receipt of a public pension for the first time 
unless we also discuss labor force exit in the same context. The reader is reminded that there is 
substantial “preretirement” without public pension income (see fig. 4.7 above). 148  Axel Borsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel 
benefits.lOAt  the same time, the reform indexed benefits to the gross wage bill, 
laying the groundwork for a system of  pensions that increased faster than net 
wages and much faster than inflation. In the face of increasing budget prob- 
lems, these two generous provisions were replaced  by  the  second  landmark 
1992 pension reform. This reform enacted a more actuarially fair formula, and 
indexation was changed to net rather than gross wages. Since the 1992  reform, 
the retirement insurance system has been modified in a continuous flurry of 
small reform steps. Several loopholes were closed, and partial retirement was 
introduced. Normal retirement age, which remained at age sixty-five for men, 
will gradually be increased by the year 2004 to age sixty-five for women as 
well. Nevertheless, it has become increasingly clear that the 1992 pension re- 
form did not  solve the demographic challenge to come. The discussion was 
still ongoing in the spring of  1997; proposals were converging toward a severe 
reduction of benefits accompanied by more reliance on private savings. 
This constant change makes it difficult to describe the German retirement 
insurance  system. Moreover,  the  1992 reform  and  its  recent  modifications 
will be fully effective only after the year 2004 because most workers are still 
“grandfathered”  by the pre- 1992 legislation. We focus our description of the 
German system on (a)  the system features between  1972 and  1992 because 
they describe the behavior  of retirees until  about the year 2000 and (b)  the 
system features after the  1992 reform  with all modifications  that have been 
enacted, including the budget reconciliation act of June 1996. 
4.2.2  Coverage and Contributions 
The German pay-as-you-go public pension system features very broad man- 
datory coverage of workers. Only the self-employed (8.9 percent of the labor 
force) and workers with earnings below the official minimum earnings thresh- 
old  (Geringfiigigkeitsgrenze, 15 percent  of  average  monthly  gross  wage- 
about 5.6 percent of all workers) are not subject to mandatory coverage.” 
Roughly 80 percent of the budget of German public retirement insurance is 
financed  by  contributions  that  are  administrated  like  a  payroll  tax,  levied 
equally on employees and employers. Total contributions in 1997 represented 
20.3 percent of the first DM 8,200 of monthly gross income (the upper earn- 
ings threshold, Beitragsbemessungsgrenze, about  180 percent of the average 
monthly gross wage).I2  Technically, contributions are split evenly between em- 
ployees and employers:  10.15 percent is deducted from the employee’s gross 
wages, and another  10.15 percent is paid directly by the employer. While the 
10. There was an adjustment for retiring at ages sixty-six and sixty-seven (see below). 
11. Some professions, most notably civil servants, have their own mandatory retirement system. 
Although implicit, these systems effectively mimic the general public pension system and  are 
included in it here. 
12. Monthly gross household income in Germany was DM 5,300 in  1996, corresponding to a 
purchasing power of U.S.$30,300  annually (based on the OECD purchasing power parity of DM 
2.10 per U.S.$l.OO). 149  Social Security and Retirement in Germany 
contribution rate has been fairly stable since 1970, the upper earnings thresh- 
old has been used as a financing instrument. The latter is anchored to the aver- 
age wage and has increased considerably faster than inflation. 
Social security benefits are essentially  tax free.I3 Pension beneficiaries  do 
not pay contributions to the pension system or to unemployment insurance.14 
However, pensioners must pay the equivalent of the employee contribution to 
the mandatory  medical insurance. The equivalent of the employer’s contribu- 
tion to health insurance is paid by the pension system. 
The remaining approximately 20 percent of the social security budget is a 
subsidy from the federal government. This subsidy is also used to fine-tune the 
pay-as-you-go budget constraint, which has a minimal reserve of one months 
worth of benefits. 
4.2.3  Public versus Private Pensions 
Public pensions provide the major source of income after retirement. Al- 
though  firm pensions exist in Germany, their role is small. In  1993-95,  21 
percent of  the male elderly and less than 9 percent of the female elderly re- 
ceived private pensions. Moreover, private pension income is small. The aver- 
age share of  private firm pensions in total  retirement income is less than 5 
percent for elderly German households (see fig. 4.9 above). One can therefore 
essentially  abstract from private pensions and contribute all incentive effects 
on retirement behavior to the public pension  system. This is quite different 
from the situation in the United Kingdom or the United States and consider- 
ably facilitates the analysis of retirement behavior in Germany. 
4.2.4  Benefit Types 
The German public pension system (or, as it is referred to in Germany, the 
retirement insurance system) provides old age pensions for workers age sixty 
and older, disability benefits for workers under age sixty that are converted to 
old age pensions at the latest at age sixty-five, and survivor benefits for spouses 
and children. In addition, preretirement (i.e., retirement before  age sixty) is 
possible through several mechanisms using the public transfer system, mainly 
unemployment compensation. We begin by describing old age pensions. 
4.2.5  Eligibility for Benefits and Retirement Age for Old Age Pensions 
Eligibility  for benefits and the minimum retirement age depend on which 
type of pension the worker chooses. The German public retirement insurance 
system distinguishes five types of  old age pensions,  displayed in table 4.1, 
corresponding to normal retirement and four types of early retirement. 
This complex system was introduced by  the  1972 social security reform. 
13. Technically, the return on the pay-as-you-go system is taxable. The return is deemed a fixed 
share of  the pension benefits that is below the general income tax exclusion unless the household 
has substantial nonpension income. 
14. An exception is the very few “partial retirees” who pay taxes on their labor income. 150  Axel Borsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel 
Table 4.1  Old Age Pensions (1972 legislation) 
Retirement 
Pension Type  Age 
A. Normal  65 
B. Long service life  63 
C. Women  60 
D. Older disabled  60 
(“flexible”) 
E. Unemployed  60 
Years of 
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One of  the key provisions was the introduction of “flexible retirement” after 
age sixty-three with full benefits for workers with a long service history. In 
addition, retirement at age sixty with full benefits is possible for women, the 
unemployed,  and older disabled workers.’s Older disabled workers refers to 
those workers who for health or labor market reasons cannot be appropriately 
employed and are age sixty or older. In order to claim old age disability bene- 
fits, one must either (1) be physically disabled (at least 50 percent), (2) pass a 
strict earnings test, or (3)  pass a much weaker earnings test. The strict earnings 
test is passed if the earnings capacity is reduced below the minimum earnings 
threshold for any reasonable occupation (about 15 percent of the average gross 
wage)-erwerbsunfahig.  l6  The weaker earnings test is passed when no vacan- 
cies corresponding to the worker’s specijc job description are available and the 
worker faces at least a 50 percent loss in earnings when changing to a different 
job-berufsunfahig.  As opposed to disability insurance for workers under age 
sixty (see below), full benefits are paid in all three cases. 
With the 1992 social security reform and its subsequent modifications, the 
age limits for types B and C of early retirement will gradually be raised to 
sixty-five. These changes will be fully phased in by the year 2004. The only 
distinguishing feature of types B and C of “early retirement” will then be the 
possibility of retiring up to five years earlier than age sixty-five if a sufficient 
number of service years (currently thirty-five) have been accumulated. As op- 
posed to the pre-1992 regulations, benefits will be adjusted to a retirement age 
below sixty-five in a fashion that we describe below. 
15. This uid age pension for disabled workers is different from the general disability pension 
16. The earnings tests are described below. For a detailed description of disability regulations, 
for younger workers. 
see Riphahn (1995). 151  Social Security and Retirement in Germany 
4.2.6  Benefits 
Benefits are strictly work related. The German system does not have the 
kinds of benefits for spouses that exist in the United States. Benefits are com- 
puted on a lifetime contribution basis and adjusted according to type of pen- 
sion and retirement age. They are the product of four elements: (1) the employ- 
ee’s relative contribution position, (2) the years of service life, (3) adjustment 
factors for pension type and (since the 1992 reform) retirement age, and (4) 
the average pension. The first three factors make up the “personal pension 
base,”  while  the  fourth  factor  determines  the income distribution  between 
workers and pensioners in general. 
The employee’s relative contribution position is computed by averaging his 
or her annual relative contribution positions over the entire earnings history. In 
each year, the relative contribution position is expressed as a multiple of  the 
average annual contribution (roughly speaking, the relative income position). 
A first element of redistribution was introduced in  1972 when this multiple 
could  not  fall below  75 percent  for contributions before  1972 provided  a 
worker had a service life of at least thirty-five years. A similar rule was intro- 
duced in the 1992 reform: for contributions between 1973 and 1992, multiples 
below 75 percent are multiplied by  1.5 up to the maximum of  75 percent, 
effectively reducing the redistribution for workers with income positions be- 
low 50 percent. 
Years of service life are years of active contributions plus years of contribu- 
tions on behalf of  the employee and years that are counted as service years 
even when no contributions were made at all. These include, for instance, years 
of unemployment, years of military service, three years for each child’s edu- 
cation (deductible by one of the parents),”  some allowance for advanced edu- 
cation,’*  etc., introducing a second element of redistribution. The official gov- 
ernment computations, such as the official replacement rate (Rentenniveau), 
assume a forty-five-year contribution history for what is deemed a “normal 
earnings history” (Eckrentner).  In fact, the average number of years of contri- 
butions is slightly under forty. Unlike in the United States, neither is there an 
upper bound of years entering the benefit calculation, nor can workers choose 
certain years in their earnings history and drop others. 
Since 1992, the average pension is determined by indexation to the average 
net labor income. This solved some of the problems that were created by index- 
ation to gross wages between 1972 and 1992. Nevertheless, wage rather than 
cost-of-living indexation makes it impossible to finance the retirement burden 
by  productivity gains. The average pension has provided a generous benefit 
level for middle-income earnings. Table 4.2 shows replacement rates and com- 
pares them to those in the United States. Note that Germany has much less 
17. Three years after the 1992 reform. The number of years has been changed frequently. 
18. This allowance used to be very generous but has been dramatically reduced recently. 152  Axel Borsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel 
Table 4.2  Replacement Ratios of Social Security Old Age Pensions 
(1972 legislation) 
Net Replacement Ratio (%) 







61  67 
55  66 
53  71 
45  17 
41  75 
30  53 
Source: Casmir (1989,508, 512). 
Note: Relative  income is expressed as a percentage of  the net wage of  an  average production 
worker with forty years of  service. Married couple supplement not included. 
redistribution than the United States. The low replacement rates for high in- 
comes result from the upper limit at which earnings are subject to social secu- 
rity contributions. 
Before 1992, the adjustment of benejits to retirement age was only implicit 
via years of  service.I9 Because benefits are proportional to years of  service, a 
worker with fewer years of  service will get lower benefits. With a constant 
income profile and forty years of service, each year of earlier retirement de- 
creased pension benefits by 2.5 percent, and vice versa. 
The 1992 social security reform changed this. Age sixty-five now acts as the 
“pivotal age” for benefit computations. For each year of earlier retirement up 
to five, and provided that the appropriate conditions outlined in table 4.1 above 
are met, benefits will be reduced by  3.6 percent (in addition to the effect of 
fewer service years). The 1992 reform also introduced rewards for later retire- 
ment in a systematic way. For each year of retirement postponed past the mini- 
mum age indicated in table 4.1, the pension is increased by 6 percent in addi- 
tion to the “natural” increase caused by number of service years. 
Table 4.3 displays the retirement age-specific adjustments for a worker who 
has earnings that remain constant after age sixty. The table relates the retire- 
ment income for retirement at age sixty-five (normalized to 100 percent) to the 
retirement income for retirement at earlier or later ages and compares the im- 
plicit adjustments after 1972 with the total adjustments after the 1992 social 
security reform is fully phased in. As references, the table also displays the 
corresponding  adjustments  in the United  States and actuarially  fair adjust- 
ments at a 3 percent discount rate (see Borsch-Supan 1992).20 
19. Curiously, before 1992 the German system provided a large increase in retirement benefits 
for work at ages sixty-six and sixty-seven. However, the incentive proved ineffective because it 
was far offset by  the inducements to early retirement. 
20. The actuarially fair adjustments equalize the expected social security wealth defined in app. 
B for a worker with an earnings history starting at age S  = 20. A  higher discount rate yields 
steeper adjustments. 153  Social Security and Retirement in Germany 
Table 4.3  Adjustment of Public Pensions by Retirement Age 
Pension as % of the Pension One Would Obtain Had One Retired at Age 65 
Germany  United States 


















89.2  80.0 
92.8  86.7 
96.4  94.4 
100.0  100.0 
106.0  103.0 
112.0  106.0 
118.0  109.0 

















Sources: Borsch-Supan ( 1992); and own calculations 
"Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung, 1972-92. 
bGesetzliche Rentenversicherung after 1992 reform has been fully phased in. 
'Social  security (OASDHI) until 1983. 
'Social  security (OASDHI) after 1983 social security reform has been fully phased in. 
"Evaluated at a 3 percent discount rate,  1992/94 mortality risks of West German males, and an 
average increase in net pensions of  1 percent per year. 
While neither the German nor the American system was actuarially fair prior 
to the reforms, the public retirement system in Germany as enacted in  1972 
was particularly distorting. There was less economic incentive for Americans 
to retire before age sixty-five and only a small disincentive to retire later than 
age sixty-five after the 1983 reform, while the German social security system 
tilted the retirement decision heavily toward the earliest retirement age appli- 
cable. The 1992 reform diminished but did not abolish this incentive effect. 
4.2.7  Related Social Security Programs 
Until  now,  we have discussed old age  benejits. Contributions to German 
retirement insurance also finance disability benejits to workers of  all ages and 
survivor benejits to spouses and children. 
In order to be eligible for disability benejits, a worker must pass one of the 
two earnings tests mentioned earlier for the old age disability pension. If the 
stricter  earnings test  is passed, full benefits  are paid  (Erwerbsunfhigkeits- 
rente, EU). If only the weaker earnings test is passed and some earnings capa- 
bility remains, disability pensions before age sixty are only two-thirds of the 
applicable old age pension (Berufsunfahigkeitsrente, BU). In the  1970s and 
early 1980s, the German courts interpreted both rules very broadly, in particu- 
lar the applicability of thc first rule. Moreover, jurisdiction also overruled the 
earnings test (see below) for earnings during disability retirement. This lead to 
a share of EU-type disability pensions of more than 90  percent of all disability 
pensions. Because both rules were used to keep unemployment rates down, 
their generous interpretation has only recently led to stricter legislation. 154  Axel Borsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel 
Survivor pensions are paid at 60 percent of the husband’s applicable pension 
if the spouse is age forty-five and over or if children are in the household (grope 
Witwenrente);  otherwise they are paid at 25 percent (kleine Witwenrente). Sur- 
vivor benefits represent a large component of the public pension budget and of 
total pension wealth, as will be shown in section 4.3 below. Certain earnings 
tests apply if the surviving spouse has her own income, for example, her own 
pension. This is relevant only for a very small share of widows-fewer  than 
10  percent. Only recently have male and female survivors been treated equally. 
As mentioned above, the German system does not have a mamed couple sup- 
plement for spouses of beneficiaries. However, most wives acquire their own 
pension by active and passive contribution (mostly years of  advanced educa- 
tion and years of child education). 
4.2.8  Preretirement 
In addition to benefits through the public pension system, transfer payments 
(mainly unemployment compensation) enable what is referred to as “preretire- 
ment.” As was shown in figure 4.7 above, labor force exit before age sixty is 
frequent: about 45 percent of  all men call themselves “retired”  at age fifty- 
nine. Only about half of them retire because of disability; the other 50 percent 
make use of one of the many official and unofficial preretirement  schemes. 
Unemployment compensation has been used as preretirement income in an 
unofficial  scheme that induced very early retirement. Before workers  could 
enter the public pension system at age sixty, they were paid a negotiable com- 
bination of unemployment compensation and supplemental or severance pay. 
At age sixty, a pension of  type E (see table 4.1 above) could be claimed. As 
the rules of  pensions of type E and the duration of  unemployment benefits 
changed, so did the “unofficial” retirement ages. Age fifty-six was particularly 
frequent in West Germany because unemployment compensation is paid up to 
three years for elderly workers; it is followed by the lower unemployment aid. 
Earlier retirement ages could be induced by paying the worker the difference 
between the last salary and non-means-tested unemployment compensation for 
three years  and for further years the difference between the last salary  and 
means-tested unemployment aid-all  depending on the so-called social plan 
that a firm would negotiate with workers before restructuring the workforce. 
In addition, early retirement at age fifty-eight was made possible under an 
official preretirement scheme (Vormhestand), in which the employer received 
a subsidy from unemployment insurance if a younger employee was hired in 
his or her place. While the first (and unofficial) preretirement scheme was very 
popular and a convenient way to overcome the strict German labor laws, few 
employers used the second, official scheme. 
4.2.9  Partial Retirement 
The 1992 reform  also introduced the concept of  partial retirement. Partial 
retirement is possible at the one-third, half, and two-thirds levels. During par- 155  Social Security and Retirement in Germany 
tial retirement, all rules and regulations apply in proportion, for example, bene- 
fits and earnings limits. For instance, if retired at the one-third level, the worker 
receives only one-third of the benefits, and only one-third of the earnings are 
applied to the earnings test. In fact, partial retirement is extremely rare. 
4.2.10  Earnings Tests 
Earnings tests apply only to early retirement (types B-E  in table 4.1 above) 
and only for the time between early retirement and age sixty-five. Normal pen- 
sions (type A in table 4.1) are paid in full irrespective of other wage or non- 
wage income. To receive benefits before age sixty-five, one must pass the strict 
earnings test  with  a relatively  small earnings limit (the minimum  earnings 
threshold mentioned earlier, about 15 percent of average gross wages). 
If  the  earnings limit  is exceeded, the benefit reduction  makes use of  the 
somewhat complicated mechanism of  partial retirement. As just mentioned, 
this case is very rare. For instance, if actual earnings are between two and three 
times the strict earnings limit, the worker will be considered one-third retired. 
Hence, the worker receives one-third of the benefits in addition to his or her 
other earnings. Earnings between  150 and 200 percent of  the earnings limit 
permit the receipt of  SO percent of benefits, earnings between  100 and  150 
percent  of  the earnings limit two-thirds  of full benefits. After age sixty-five, 
the earnings tests no longer apply, and full benefits are paid irrespective of the 
type of pension. 
4.2.11  Resulting Retirement Patterns 
The regulations of the German pension system are perfectly reflected in the 
distribution of the ages at which workers receive a public pension for the first 
time, depicted in figure 4.11. There are essentially three ages for entry (as a 
beneficiary)  into the  German public pension  system: sixty, sixty-three, and 
sixty-five. Very few people enter at other ages. This bundling is entirely created 
by the institutional provisions of the public pension system. By 1995, sixty had 
become the most popular entry  age for male and female workers.  For male 
workers sixty-three is the next important entry age, while for female workers 
it is sixty. There is no spike at age sixty-three because women  may  receive 
public pensions at age sixty unless they have a service life of fewer than fifteen 
years. This is unlike the pattern among male workers, who may receive a public 
pension at age sixty only if they are unemployed or disabled. In turn, there are 
more women receiving a public pension for the first time at age sixty-five be- 
cause more women than men have short earnings histories. 
Figure 4.12 displays an estimate of the related hazard rate, defined as new 
beneficiaries of the public pension system (from fig. 4.11) divided by the total 
number of workers in the labor force. Unfortunately, currently no reliable data 
exist with which to compute the number of “persons at risk” for a true hazard 
rate. While there are data on dependent workers who are currently employed 
and are eligible for public pension benefits, there is a large number of so-called 156  Axel Borsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel 








45  50  55  60  65  70 
Age 





1  0% 
5% 
0% 
45  50  55  60 
Age 
65  70 
Fig. 4.11  Distribution of public pension retirement ages: a, males; b, females 
Source: VdR data (complete enumeration of entries into retirement). 
Nore: Distribution of  age of  workers receiving benefits for the first time in 1995. 
latently insured persons who have acquired some claim on public pensions. 
Many of these persons will eventually receive a public pension. For example, 
all self-employed persons who have served in the military  as a conscript  or 
who  have  done  an  apprenticeship  earlier  in  their  career  are  technically 
“insured.”  The problem  is  particularly  severe for women;  thus,  we  do not 
display hazard rates for women. For men, our estimate in figure 4.12 shows 157  Social Security and Retirement in Germany 
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Fig. 4.12  Retirement hazard rates by age-males 
Source: VdR data (complete enumeration of entries into retirement). 
No&: Hazard rates have been estimated from the empirical distribution of males claiming retire- 
ment benefits (disability and old age) for the first time in the year  1995. Numbers (derived from 
flows) do not match perfectly with fig. 4.7 above, which is based on survey data on stocks. 
three “spikes” at ages sixty, sixty-three, and sixty-five. Fifty percent of eligible 
males receive their first pension at age sixty; of  those who continue to work 
until age sixty-three, 70 percent enter the public pension system at that age; 
virtually no one postpones entry into the public pension  system beyond age 
sixty-five. 
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 relate retirement to receiving a public pension for the 
first time. Figure 4.13 relates it to labor force exit. The figure displays the age 
distribution of  labor force exits, together with the age distribution of public 
pension entries, on the basis of  GSOEP survey data. Figure 4.13 shows that 
the spikes in public pension entry can be accounted for only partially by labor 
force exits. They are also partially due to “conversions” from other out-of-the- 
labor-market states (preretirement schemes) to public pensions. Preretirement 
has a spike at age fifty-six, as described above. Note that figure 4.13 corre- 
sponds to figure 4.7 above, which showed stocks rather than flows. The pattern 
of public pension entries in figure 4.13 is virtually the same as in figure 4.11, 
although the former is based on a sample, while the latter is a complete count 
of all new beneficiaries. 
4.2.12  The Integration of East Germany 
Since January 1992, Germany has a unified public pension system with the 
same replacement ratios and the same adjustment factors for new pensioners. 
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Fig. 4.13  Age distribution of labor force exit and public pension 
receipt-males 
Sources: GSOEP 1993-95; own calculations. 
ment rates refer to the relative wage level in either part of the country. Before 
January  1992, the situation is complicated by  the transition  of the old East 
German system to the West German one. Between  1990 and  1992, existing 
pensions in East Germany were revalued several times. In the rest of this sec- 
tion, we describe this process and briefly comment on some of the problems 
that arose during the transition process.21 
The entire East German social security system was organized in one com- 
prehensive  institution (Sozialversicherung),22  financed  in equal parts by  the 
state budget and by  contributions from workers. This system had to be inte- 
grated into the western one, which consists of three independent institutions: 
social health, unemployment, and retirement insurance, each of which is sepa- 
rately financed by earnings-related contributions and only relatively modestly 
subsidized by the federal budget. 
As opposed to the West German system described above, the comprehensive 
East German social security system aimed to reintegrate people into the labor 
force and to keep them working  as long as possible. As a consequence, the 
relative position of pensioners in East Germany was poor by international stan- 
dards, although most comparisons do not account for the high subsidy of ev- 
eryday goods in the former East Germany. 
The retirement system of  the former East Germany included a mandatory 
and a voluntary part, which made the transition  to the completely mandatory 
21. For details of  the transition, see Schrnihl(l991, 1992). 
22.  More  precisely,  there  were  two  institutions,  the  Sozialversicherung  der Arbeiter  und 
Angestellten and the Sozialversicherung bei der staatlichen Versicherung der DDR. 159  Social Security and Retirement in  Germany 
western system even more problematic. The mandatory part covered the first 
M 600 of  income, about 45  percent of  the average East German income. In 
1971, a voluntary part of the public insurance was introduced (Freiwillige Zu- 
satzrentenversicherung). In addition, there existed more than sixty supplemen- 
tary insurance schemes for certain sectors (e.g., doctors, teachers, and-con- 
troversial after unification-the  police, the army, and the intelligence service). 
Taking mandatory and voluntary insurance together, the typical replacement 
rate varied between 49.9 percent for workers retiring in 1970 and 62.7 percent 
for workers retiring in  1990.23  Retirement  age had  been  fixed at sixty  for 
women and sixty-five for men. 
As a result of the different supplementary insurance schemes, existing pen- 
sions in East Germany were partly higher, partly lower than they would have 
been had they been calculated under West German rules. The transition process 
involved two simultaneous changes. First, pensions had to be recalculated on 
the basis of  the West German law. The level so obtained had to be revalued 
with respect to the currency exchange rate and the relative income standard in 
East Germany. These revaluations  were governed by political, not economic, 
decisions. Pensions lower than their West German equivalents were immedi- 
ately raised to the level in West Germany, at least to the level of  social assis- 
tance. Pensions that were higher than their West German equivalents were re- 
duced in a stepwise fashion to the level in West Germany. This reduction was 
achieved by  at least partly excluding the workers involved from the general 
income increases in the process of wage and pension revaluation. 
Taking both  adjustments together,  East  German  pensions  on average  in- 
creased by  about 60 percent between  mid-1990 and mid-1991, the first year 
after the introduction of the deutsche mark. The average pension in East Ger- 
many is now essentially equal to the West German average.24  Only two-thirds 
of  this increase was covered by  payroll contributions, with the result that a 
considerable subsidy had to be paid out of  the West German federal budget 
(Schmahl 1992). 
At the same time, the fixed retirement age in the former East Germany was 
abolished in favor of the West German 1972 window rules, as described above. 
Moreover, special regulations to keep the statistical unemployment rate down 
(Vorruhestundsregelungen)  were introduced, permitting retirement at age fifty- 
five in East Germany with a net replacement rate of about 65 percent. 
23. Comparing standard  workers with equal  income  and  years of  service (Schmihl  1992, 
table 1). 
24. This is due to two compensating effects: average service life was much longer in East Ger- 
many (forty-seven years for men) than in West Germany (thirty-nine years for men); average earn- 
ings, however, were about 20 percent lower in the East. In addition, female labor force participa- 
tion in the East was dramatically higher than in  the West, raising the average pension for East 
German women to almost 30 percent above the pension for West German women. 160  Axel Borsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel 
4.3  Retirement Incentives: Accrual Rates of Pension Wealth 
As emphasized in the previous section, German retirement insurance creates 
strong incentives to retire early. Postponing retirement by one year has two 
negative effects on social security wealth: the worker must give up one year of 
(net) pensions, and he must pay contributions of about 20 percent of his current 
gross earnings. On the other hand, postponing retirement raises pensions by 
3.6 percent through the adjustment factor (after the 1992 reform has been fully 
phased in). This increase is less than the actuarially fair adjustment of between 
6.5 and 8 percent  per year (depending on the age of the worker),  which  is 
required to compensate for mere waiting. The additional year of contributions 
raises the future pension  income profile  and the expected value of survivor 
benefits by roughly one-fortieth. 
The incentives to retire are conveniently expressed as accrual rates of social 
security wealth. Accrual  is defined  as the expected  gain in  social security 
wealth by postponing retirement one year. Accrual rates express the relative 
gain, that is, the accrual of postponing retirement one year relative to social 
security wealth in a given year. We define social security wealth as the expected 
net present  value of  social security benefits  minus any contributions to the 
public pension system during the retirement window, here defined as the age 
range from fifty-five through seventy. Contributions before  age fifty-five are 
sunk. All calculations use  1992/94 mortality  tables, conditioned on survival 
until age fifty-five. In computing present discounted values, we use a 3 percent 
discount rate as a baseline. Precise definitions can be found in appendix B. 
As long as social security wealth accrual is positive, it is rational to postpone 
retirement unless laborneisure preferences or similar considerations dominate 
the expected gain in social security wealth. Negative accrual rates from a cer- 
tain age on are sufficient (although not necessary) for retirement at that age. 
We use the benefit and contribution rules described in the previous section 
to compute pension wealth for synthetic income profiles of different types of 
households. Applying  (historical or projected) contribution rates  and limits, 
we compute the social security contributions of households in each year. Con- 
tributions are converted to relative contribution positions for each year and are 
accumulated over time. This yields the first element in the benefit formula, a 
life-cycle measure of relative contributions. Once the worker  is eligible for 
retirement benefits, we multiply the relative contribution position by years of 
service and apply the adjustment factors of  table 4.3 above. Finally, the per- 
sonal pension base is multiplied by the average pension. We compute accrual 
rates of social security wealth from age fifty-five on, although-assuming  that 
the worker does not apply for disability pensions-he  will not be able to re- 
ceive old age social security benefits at that age. 
After 1996, we assume a real increase in average pensions equal to the (pro- 
jected) real net wage increase. 
Up to the year 1996, we use historical data on contributions, average wages, 161  Social Security and Retirement in Germany 
and pensions. After  1996, we have to use projected real wage increases and 
projected  social security contribution rates. In the basic scenario, net wages 
are assumed to grow by  1 percent annually in real terms,25  and contributions 
are computed using the budget constraint of the pay-as-you-go system, based 
on the  median  demographic  projection  by  the Federal  Statistical Office  of 
Germany.26 
As a base case, we consider a married couple with a husband born in 1930 
and a wife born in  1933.*’ We assume that the husband is the main income 
earner and that the wife is eligible for full survivor benefits.** Our base-case 
earnings history  starts in  1950, when the worker has reached age twenty. In 
1985, this worker is age fifty-fi~e.~~  Our base-case worker has an average labor 
income history  and an age-earnings profile that is increasing until age fifty- 
five.30  Thus, the average earner is earning less than the average aggregate labor 
income in his early work life (72 percent at age twenty) and more than that 
later on ( 112 percent from age fifty-five). The average aggregate labor income 
is drawn from the GRV administration records. We also do the same calcula- 
tion for workers with 0.7 and 1.77 times the average income, corresponding to 
the mean labor income of the lowest and the highest labor income de~ile.~’ 
The accrual rates for the base case are displayed in figure 4.14 below. Fig- 
ures 4.15-4.20  below compare the accrual rates of variations of the base case. 
In figure 4.14, we present accrual rates that would have prevailed had the 1972 
law  still been in place. We  then  show accrual rates for a  1 percent  and a 6 
percent discount rate. Then we vary mortality. In the high-mortality  case, we 
multiply the probability that a person dies at each given age by  1.16 until survi- 
vor rates are zero; in the low-mortality case, we multiply by 0.84. Finally, we 
present accrual rates for the low- and high-income cases. Detailed numerical 
results are available on request. 
Figure 4.14 shows the accrual rates for our base case, the average earner. It 
is a hypothetical case as we apply the social security rules as if the 1992 reform 
had been fully phased in. Before age sixty, the worker is not eligible for public 
pension benefits. Working a year longer at age fifty-five yields a pension that 
is one-thirty-fifth higher (one additional year of average earnings, relative to 
25. The increase between 1985 and 1995 was 4 percent per year. In 1996, however, the increase 
26. Eighth coordinated population projection, medium scenario (see Sommer 1994). 
27. Using the 1985-95 waves of the GSOEP, we estimated the average age difference-control- 
ling for age and cohort effects-for  this cohort to be approximately three years at retirement age. 
28. The means test for survivor benefits is very weak. Only 10 percent of widows’ own pensions 
fall above the means test, and only 40 percent of the amount exceeding the limit is deducted from 
the survivor benefit. 
29. By choosing age twenty as the start of the worker’s earnings history, we assume that the 
worker has accumulated enough years of service to qualify for type B (“flexible”) early retirement 
up to five years before age sixty-five. 
30. The earnings profiles have been estimated using the 1 percent sample from the West German 
social security records and are taken from Fitzenberger et al. (1995). 
31. Based on the labor earnings distribution drawn from the 1995 GSOEP. 
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Fig. 4.14  Accrual rates of social security wealth (base case) 
Nore: Accrual of  social security wealth when retiring one year later as percentage of  net social 
security wealth (for a precise definition, see app. B). Figures 4.15-4.20  below display accrual rates 
for alternative simulations. 
thirty-five years  of  past  earnings history). At a 3 percent discount rate and 
about a 1 percent chance of dying at that age, accrual of expected social secu- 
rity wealth is slightly negative. At age sixty, the worker becomes eligible for 
pension benefits according to the  1992 reform, although at reduced benefits. 
Postponing retirement from age sixty to age sixty-one increases pensions by 
3.6 percent. However, this is more than offset by a 3 percent discount rate, a 
chance of dying now of 1.5 percent, and a reduction of the length of retirement 
by  about 5.5  percent (based on a life expectancy of  18.3 years at age sixty). 
With the increase in mortality risk, accrual rates become more and more nega- 
tive until age sixty-five, the “normal retirement age.” After age sixty-five, bene- 
fits are increased by 6 percent for each year of postponement. This raises the 
accrual rates dramatically. However, with the exception of postponing retire- 
ment from sixty-five to sixty-six, all further accrual rates remain negative. 
Figure 4.14 clearly shows that the adjustments of pension benefits to retire- 
ment age established in the 1992 pension reform (see table 4.2 above) are not 
sufficient to offset the shorter period of retirement, the quickly increasing mor- 
tality risk, and the additional years of contributions. 
Figure 4.15 compares the  1992 law with  the regulations that applied be- 
tween  1972 and  1992. Because the  1992 law will not be fully implemented 
until the year 2004, this simulation more closely represents the current retire- 
ment incentives. While the pattern is qualitatively similar to that in figure 4.14, 
all accrual rates are lower and negative. The magnitudes are relatively large: 
postponing retirement between the ages of sixty-two and sixty-five by one year 
corresponds to a loss of more than 6 percent. The 1972 law thus yields a very 
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with these  incentives, although  it substantially reduced  them.  Most  signifi- 
cantly, accrual rates are still negative until age sixty-five. Hence, even the re- 
formed system encourages workers to retire early. 
A lower discount rate reduces the penalty of postponing retirement. Figure 
4.16 displays this effect, based on the 1992 legislation. The incentive to post- 
pone retirement before age sixty-five remains negative even at very small dis- 
count rates. With a high discount rate, the incentives to retire late are strongly 
negative throughout. 
The sensitivity to mortality is similar and shown in figure 4.17. Lower mor- 
tality raises the accrual rates, while higher mortality lowers them. Even at very 
optimistic mortality assumptions, however, the incentives to postpone retire- 
ment between the ages of sixty and sixty-five remain negative. 
Figure 4.18 changes the relative income position. Accrual rates are insensi- 
tive to income variations within  the lowest and the highest  deciles as they 164  Axel Borsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel 
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change benefits and contributions in proportion. This is due to the condensed 
income distribution in Germany, where the lowest decile is represented by  30 
percent less and the highest less than 80 percent more than the average labor 
income. The income redistribution mechanism in the form of a lower bound of 
the relative contribution position alters the accrual rates only for extremely low 
incomes, although the strong incentive effects to retire early remain essentially 
in place. 
These negative incentive effects are even stronger for singles. Figure 4.19 
varies marital status; single corresponds to a single male earner. The main rea- 
son for this sensitivity is the leverage added by survivor benefits. The younger 
the wife, the higher total expected benefits. The penalty for postponing retire- 
ment varies roughly in proportion to the sum of expected benefits. Hence, in- 
creasing the differences in the age of husband and spouse works like the de- 
crease in mortality depicted in figure 4.17 above. 165  Social Security and Retirement in Germany 
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Finally, figure 4.20 shows the difference between being able and not being 
able to claim disability benefits before age sixty. In the first case, benefits are 
not adjusted to retirement age at all. In addition, the earnings record is aug- 
mented by fictitious earnings of one-third of  the preretirement average annual 
earnings for each year of disability until age sixty. Thus, the accrual rates are 
strongly negative, creating a strong incentive to seek disability status, for ex- 
ample, by  invoking one of  the labor market conditions described in section 
4.2 above. 
Figures 4.21-4.27  below translate social security wealth accrual into a more 
convenient metric: they relate the accrual of social security wealth by postpon- 
ing retirement to projected  earnings during postponement. If  this accrual is 
positive,  the workers of the  same age remaining in the workforce  subsidize 166  Axel Borsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel 
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those who have already  retired. Figures 4.2 1-4.27  actually display  negative 
accrual divided by projected earnings, hence the tax rate by  which an addi- 
tional year of work is taxed relative to a year of retirement. 
As figure 4.21 shows, additional work is indeed taxed and at relatively high 
rates, reaching almost 30 percent at age sixty-four. Under the 1972 legislation, 
these implicit tax rates were even higher, exceeding 50 percent between  age 
sixty and age sixty-four and again after age sixty-seven  (see fig. 4.22). Tax 
rates are even positive before age sixty when a worker retires without receiving 
pension benefits until age sixty. This is because the increase in the pension that 167  Social Security and Retirement in Germany 
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the worker will eventually receive at age sixty is less than the loss in wealth 
due to the additional contributions. 
Figures 4.23-4.26  show variations  in the discount rate, mortality, income 
level, and marital status. They repeat the patterns already shown in the accrual 
rates. Postponing retirement is virtually  always a bad economic proposition. 
Only under a very low discount rate, very low mortality, or a very large age 
differential between  husband  and  spouse  is  the  accrual  of  social  security 
wealth between age sixty-five and age sixty-seven  smaller than the projected 
earnings during this postponement period. 
Finally, figure 4.27 shows the benefit of  claiming disability status. In this 
case, the implicit tax rate on additional work exceeds 50 percent between the 
ages of fifty-five and sixty-four. The additional pension wealth gained by dis- 
ability status is DM 148,000 (almost 2.5 years of average annual gross wages). 168  Axel Borsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel 
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These simulations show quite clearly that retirement incentives are strong in 
Germany. The following section looks at the actual evidence in Germany. 
4.4  Effects of Social Security on Retirement: Evidence in Germany 
The German  retirement  patterns  depicted  in  section 4.1  above,  and  the 
spikes in the hazards to retire visible in figures 4.11 and 4.13 above, suggest a 
strong relation  to the provisions  of  the German retirement system that were 
described in the previous section, specifically, to the lack of actuarial adjust- 
ment of benefits to the various forms of early retirement. This section collects 
further evidence in this direction. We  first look  at the few “natural  experi- 169  Social Security and Retirement in Germany 
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ments” that have taken place in the German retirement system: the 1972 social 
security reform, subsequent modifications in particular of the requirements to 
claim disability benefits, and the transition  in East Germany to the West Ger- 
man pension system. We then summarize the evidence from the available mi- 
croeconometric studies of the German pension system. 
The sharp  decline  in  labor  force  participation  between  1970 and  1980, 
which was depicted in figure 4.1 above, is associated with a steep decline in 
the average retirement age, defined as the average age of all new social security 
claimants in a given year. Figure 4.28 plots the average retirement age against 
the time axis. It shows clearly the effects of the introduction of early retirement 
at full benefits that were introduced in the 1972 German social security reform. 
The reform  was enacted in the beginning of  1973. Retirement age declines 
sharply  from age 63 to age 58.5 after  1973. The spike in  1973 is due to a 
composition effect: the average retirement age within both categories of retire- 
ment dropped significantly (from 57.8 to 57.1 for disability and from 6.5.1 to 
64.5 for old age retirement). At the same time, the number of old age retire- 
ments increased in absolute numbers and relative to disability retirement due 
to the introduction of early retirement at age sixty-three without a health test. 
Also, this new possibility  to retire early initially  substituted  for claiming 
disability. As figure 4.29 shows, disability is one of the major pathways to re- 
tirement in Germany.’? Note that figure 4.29 distinguishes two kinds of disabil- 
ity: disability claims before and after age sixty. In  1972, immediately before 
the pension reform, about 50 percent  of  all new retirees claimed disability. 
This percentage dropped by almost 1.5 percent in the single year after the 1972 
reform. Claims for disability benefits then began increasing again and peaked 
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Source: VdR (1997). 
Note: Average age of retirement in given year (disability and old age). The spike in 1973 is due to 
a composition effect: the 1972 reform introduced retirement at age 63, which increased dramati- 
cally the number of old age retirements relative to disability retirements. At the same time, average 
retirement age dropped in both old age and disability retirements. 
in 198  1, when more than 70 percent of new retirees used one of the two disabil- 
ity pathways. From 198  1 on, the requirements for disability benefits were made 
gradually tighter, and the proportion of disability claimants declined to some 
45 percent in 1995. 
The other pathways to retirement include an increasing share of early retire- 
ment due to unemployment. Because of  an increase in interrupted earnings 
histories, the share of “normal” retirees at age sixty-five also increased  since 
the mid-1980s. 
Figure 4.30  presents a closer look at the effects of the 1972  pension reform. 
It shows most clearly the change in the frequency of specific retirement ages 
chosen. The introduction of the window replaced the almost universal retire- 
ment age of sixty-five before 1972 by an almost even split between age sixty- 
three and age sixty-five within the first years after the reform. By 1980, sixty 
became the most frequent age of retirement. 
The patterns in figures 4.28 and 4.29 above suggest a causal relation between 
retirement incentives and behavior. More formal econometric analyses were 
carried out by Borsch-Supan (1992), Schmidt (1993, and Borsch-Supan and 
Schmidt (in press). These studies used microeconometric option value analyses 
to compute the incentive effects of the nonactuarial adjustment of benefits in 
the German  social security  system on early retirement. The option value of 55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65  66  67  68  69  70 
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Fig. 4.30  Distribution of retirement ages: Q, before the 1972 reform; b, after the 
1972 reform; c, 1970-80 
Source: VdR Rentzugangsstatistik (white-collar workers, male). 
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postponing retirement is computed according to Stock and Wise (1990) and 
inserted as an independent variable in a binary logit regression of labor force 
participation (Borsch-Supan  1992) and various hazard models of  the retire- 
ment age (Schmidt 1995; Borsch-Supan and Schmidt, in press). The models 
are applied to West and East German panel data (GSOEP 1984-90  in West 
Germany, GSOEP 1990-92  in East Germany). 
Both methodologies produce almost identical results. The option value has 
strong predictive power; its coefficient is highly significant and large. The au- 
thors use these results in several micro-simulation models to predict retirement 
ages under alternative retirement  age-dependent  adjustment formulas. For 
each sample person, the option value is changed from its actual value to the 
value that results from inserting alternative adjustment factors in the pension 
computation formula (see table 4.3 above). 
Table 4.4 summarizes the results in terms of average retirement ages and the 
percentage taking very early retirement (before age sixty). The first row gives 
the baseline retirement age under the old German public pension system as 
observed in 1984. The low average retirement age is due to (physical and eco- 
nomic) disability retirement. The second row predicts the effects of the 1992 
German  social security reform. This reform  will  remove some, but by  no 
means all, of  the distortions toward early retirement when it is finally fully 
implemented in 2004. It will increase the average retirement age by about half 
a year. The micro simulation also reveals that retirement before age sixty is 
reduced from 32.2 to 28.2 percent. 174  Axel Borsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel 
Table 4.4  Simulated Retirement Age and Early Retirement 
Early Retirement 
Mean Retirement  (%) (retirement 
Age  age < 60) 
System before 1992 reform  58.5  32.2 
After 1992 reform  59.0  28.2 
Nondistorting system  60.6  17.8 
Sources: Borsch-Supan (1992); and Borsch-Supan and Schmidt (in press). 
The third row shows the effect of switching to a nondistorting system with 
adjustment factors computed for the discount rate estimated in the retirement 
probability model (see table 4.3 above). The simulation reveals a strong reac- 
tion to this change in the social security system. A nondistorting system would 
shift the retirement age by more than two years. The effects of a nondistorting 
system are most powerful in the reduction of  early retirement, that is, retire- 
ment before the official window period. Retirement at ages fifty-nine and be- 
low would drop from the current 32.2 percent to 17.8 percent. 
Riphahn (1995) has analyzed the disability provisions of the German retire- 
ment insurance system and found strong incentive effects. While she used a 
small data set derived from the German panel (GSOEP), she confirms the ag- 
gregate time-series results of Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein (1990) that show that 
the proportion of  disability pensions varied  strongly and positively  with the 
generosity of the disability provisions. 
Riphahn and Schmidt (1995) and Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein (1987) attempt to 
disentangle  labor  supply from  labor  demand  effects,  using  aggregate  data. 
While the results obtained by Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein are not fully conclusive, 
the analysis by  Riphahn and Schmidt shows a dominance of  supply effects, 
largely introduced by the incentives of an actuarially unfair pension formula. 
Finally, unification  provided  another “natural experiment”  to identify the 
incentive effects of  the German retirement  system. The introduction of the 
deutsche mark at a one-to-one exchange rate resulted in a massive increase in 
unit labor cost in East Germany, leading to a dramatic decrease in labor de- 
mand. The result was huge unemployment. In addition, labor force participa- 
tion decreased sharply across all ages, but particularly so for ages fifty and 
over (table 4.5A). Rates of transition into early retirement were exceptionally 
high:  around five times as high as in the western  part of the country (table 
4%).  This resulted in a mean retirement age in East Germany more than three 
years younger than in West Germany (table 4.5C). 
Most of this early retirement appears to have been induced by the very gen- 
erous early retirement  provisions  in East Germany mentioned at the end of 
section 4.2 above. Borsch-Supan and Schmidt (in press) investigate the magni- 
tude of this inducement effect. Their paper uses the methodology  mentioned 
earlier in this section: for a large sample of West and East German workers, 175  Social Security and Retirement in Germany 
Table 4.5  Labor Force Transition in East Germany 
A. The Rapid Decline in Labor Force Participation in East Germany (%) 
1990  1991  1992 
Full-time employed  56.9  44.5  37.4 
Not in labor force  33.6  48.3  59.1 
Observations  3,764  3,456  3,328 
B. Transitions out of the Labor Force in East and West Germany 
West Germany, 198490  East Germany, 1990-92 
Male  Female  Total  Male  Female  Total 
Initially in labor force  1,589  780  2,369  483  482  965 
Transitions per year  65.3  46.9  101.3  95.0  105.0  200.5 
Transitions rate (%)  4.1  6.0  4.3  19  21  20.0 
C.  Mean Age at Labor Force Exit, 1984-90 
Men  Women  Total 
East Germany  55.4  56.3  55.8 
West Germany  58.3  56.5  57.7 
Sources: Borsch-Supan and Schmidt (in press); 1990-92  waves of the East Geman SOEP based 
on all panel members of age forty-four and above in 1990. 
the paper computes the option value of postponing retirement and inserts this 
value alongside other sociodemographic variables in a hazard model of retire- 
ment. In spite of the even greater generosity of early retirement provisions and 
the very different circumstances in East Germany, the authors estimate strik- 
ingly similar effects of the retirement incentives as measured by the respective 
coefficients of the option values in the East and West German regressions. 
Hence, conditional on the d@erent incentives in East and West Germany, the 
response to these incentives is rather similar and very strong in both parts of 
the country. 
4.5  Outlook 
The responsiveness of the choice of retirement age to the incentives offered 
by the pension system has strong policy implications. Not only does the public 
pension system in Germany dispense with using the retirement age-dependent 
adjustments as policy instruments for balancing the budget of the pension sys- 
tem, but it even yields incentives that work against this because the adjustments 
are not actuarially fair. Rather than rewarding later retirement to moderate the 
labor supply disincentives created by rapidly rising social security taxes, social 
security regulations in Germany have encouraged early retirement, thus aggra- 176  Axel Borsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel 
vating the imbalance between the number of workers and pensioners in times 
of population aging. 
The 1992 German social security reform will only moderately remove some 
of these distortions when fully phased in (in 2004). It is predicted to increase 
the average retirement age by only about half a year. A truly age-neutral system 
would shift the retirement age by up to four times as much. 
The renewed social security debate in Germany, only a few years after the 
most recent reform, focuses on further changes in the benefit structure and 
applicable retirement ages. Major changes, such as a transition from the cur- 
rent pay-as-you-go  system to a partially or fully funded system, are not seri- 
ously debated among government officials. While such considerations as meet- 
ing the Maastricht criteria and reducing the high unemployment rate dominate 
the current social security debate in Germany, one should keep in mind that 
changing the retirement  system later will become more complicated by  the 
change in the politics  of  the social security system: the political  power will 
shift from the working population to the retired population, that is, to an elec- 
torate that is unlikely  substantially to change the balance between per capita 




Since 1957, the Federal Statistical Office conducts a yearly survey called the 
Mikrozensus (MZ), which is comparable to the American Current Population 
Survey. The MZ is the main  source of  official population and labor market 
statistics in Germany. 
The MZ is a 1 percent random sample of the residential population in Ger- 
many, stratified by regional variables (state, size of citykounty, etc.). The pri- 
mary sampling units are households. All household members age sixteen and 
older are personally interviewed. Before German unification, sample size was 
approximately 250,000 households and 600,000 persons. The questionnaire is 
regulated by federal law and includes information on demographics, household 
structure, labor market status, and sources of income. Unfortunately, until very 
recently, access to the raw data was extremely limited owing to restrictive data 
protection regulations. The latest versions are now available as public-use files 
on submission of a research proposal to the Federal Statistical Office in Wies- 
baden. 
The Federal  Statistical  Office  publishes  extensive tabulations  of  results 
based on the MZ and also conducts specific analyses on request (analyses for 
which it charges). Our historical data are based on publications of the Federal 177  Social Security and Retirement in Germany 
Statistical Office: the statistical yearbooks and the more detailed series called 
Fachserien. 
Verband deutscher Rentenversicherungstrager Data 
The Verband deutscher Rentenversicherungstrager (VdR) is a federal insti- 
tution that represents the twenty-three social security agencies of the German 
states (Landesversicherungsanstalten), the federally organized social security 
branch for white-collar workers (Bundesversicherungsanstalt fur Angestellte), 
and some occupation-specific organizations (e.g., the mining industry). By fed- 
eral law, one of the tasks of the VdR is to provide statistics on the German so- 
cial security system. 
The VdR data on social security pensions include all employees who are 
enrolled in the public pension system (as contributors and as beneficiaries) and 
are based on the individual social security accounts and the payments of pen- 
sions through the postal service (Deutsche Post AG, formerly Deutsche Bunde- 
spost).  Each  individual  record  consists of  some hundred variables,  such as 
demographic information, complete contribution history, years of  service, re- 
tirement age, type of pension, and pension income. These data are not available 
to researchers outside the VdR. The VdR publishes for each year tabulations 
of  stock and flow data on pensions and retirement. Our hazard rates of retire- 
ment are based on the VdR publications on retirement  (by age) and on the 
number of employees covered by the social security system (by age). 
Unfortunately,  the  number  of persons retiring also includes persons  who 
were self-employed  or not working previous  to retirement. This reduces the 
value of the VdR data in computing retirement hazard rates. Almost every Ger- 
man has a social security record and thus some (“latent”) pension claims that 
will eventually lead to some pension payments. Women often change from an 
“out-of-labor-market status” into retirement. Thus, one cannot calculate reli- 
able hazard rates without knowing the labor force status before retirement for 
women. The bias of hazard rates for men is less severe because the number of 
self-employed men is small and one can correct the number of males in the 
labor force by using the Mikrozensus data. 
The available VdR data have no intertemporal links. Hence, one cannot iden- 
tify where a new entrant into the public pension system comes from. We use 
the GSOEP data to link labor force exit with public pension entry. 
Publications by the Department of Labor and Social Affairs 
The German Department of Labor and Social Affairs (Bundesministerium 
fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung, BMAS) publishes historical data on the German 
public pension system. These include contribution rates, contribution limits, 
average earnings, average pension, net and gross replacement rates, the volume 
of contributions and benefits by type of pension, and the number of contribu- 
tors and beneficiaries. These data are contained in several publications that are 
available on request (BMAS 1990, 1996a, 1996b). 178  Axel Borsch-Supan and Reinhold Schnabel 
The German Socio-Economic  Panel 
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is an annual panel study of 
some six thousand households and some fifteen thousand individuals. Its de- 
sign closely corresponds to the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 
The panel was begun in 1984; twelve waves were available in 1997. Response 
rates and panel mortality  are comparable to the PSID. The GSOEP data pro- 
vide a detailed account of income and employment status. The data are used 
extensively in Germany, and increasing interest in the United States prompted 
the construction of an English-language user file available from Richard Burk- 
hauser and his associates at Syracuse University. Burkhauser (1991) reports on 
the usefulness of the German panel data and provides English-language code 
books as well as an internationally accessible GSOEP version. 
Already in 1990, the West German panel was augmented by an East German 
sample. This permitted a fascinating account of the transition in East Germany. 
The sample size of GSOEP waves is considerably smaller than that of the 
MZ waves or the VdR enumerations. The GSOEP analyses in this paper are 
based on cells by  age and gender that contain roughly three to four hundred 
persons aged forty-five to sixty, roughly  two to three hundred persons aged 
sixty to sixty-seven (male) and sixty to seventy-two (female), and otherwise 
roughly one to two hundred persons. 
Appendix B 
Computation of Social Security Wealth 
Social security wealth is defined as expected present discounted value of bene- 
fits minus applicable contributions. Seen from the perspective of a worker who 
is S  years old and plans to retire at age R, social security wealth (SSW) is com- 
puted as follows: 
c.3  R-l 
SSWl(R)  = 2 YPEN,(R)  . u(s),  . 6r-s - 2  C,  . YLAB,. u(s),  . a'-', 
i=R  r=s 
where SSW = present discounted value of retirement benefits (= social secu- 
rity wealth); S  = planning age; R = retirement age; YLAB, = labor income at 
age t;  YPEN,(R) = pension income at age t for retirement at age R; c, = contri- 
bution rate to pension system at age t;  a(s),  = probability of surviving at least 
until age t given survival until age S; and 6 = discount factor = 1/(  1 + r). 
The calculations for a couple are more complicated. They include benefits 
for the surviving spouse, weighted by the survival probability  of  the spouse. 179  Social Security and Retirement in Germany 
For a formal description, see Diamond and Gruber, chap. 11 in this volume, 
The accrual rate of social security wealth between age t - 1 and age t is 
app.). 
defined as 
ACCR,,(t)  = [SSW,,(t) - SSW,,(t - 1)]/  SSW,,(t - 1). 
Note that these rates are computed from the perspective of a fifty-five-year-old 
worker (S = 55). 
Replacement rate denotes the ratio of the pension (YPEN) that the worker 
would receive if  he would retire at that age to the approximate net wages 
(YLABNET)  he would earn if he would postpone retirement. Note that the mor- 
tality risk does not enter this calculation: 
REPL(t) = YPEN,(t) / YLABF. 
Tax rate refers to the ratio of  the negative social security wealth (SSW) ac- 
crual to the approximate net wages (YLABNET)  that the worker would earn if 
he would postpone retirement. Note that SSW is an expected present value 
including discounting and mortality risk and that YLAB ignores the probabil- 
ity that the worker could die before age seventy: 
TAXR(t) = -  [SSW,,(t) - SSW,,(t - 1)]/ YLABY. 
A negative tax rate represents a “subsidy” to the pensioner. 
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